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Developing economies are on course to raise a record sum in global debt markets this year, as
ultra-low rates in the developed world cheapen borrowing costs (CNBC, September 4 2016)
[...] investors are now more cautious and discriminating, and market access is more uncertain
(Moody's, April 20 2016)
1 Introduction
Little is known about the predictability of sovereign credit spreads in markets where investors
are non-trivially exposed to default risk. Beyond academia, ﬁlling this vacuum is important
for several reasons. Being able to generate accurate out-of-sample (or real-time) predictions
of emerging sovereign credit spreads at various maturities is essential for pricing emerging
market assets and derivatives, and for international portfolio management. Furthermore,
understanding how domestic and global factors aﬀect future international borrowing costs
should enable emerging market borrowers to develop better informed economic policies.
The systemic importance of the emerging sovereign debt market makes the construction of
predictive models of emerging market credit spreads a very relevant task for ﬁnancial market
regulators. The defaults of several Latin American and Asian governments (besides Russia)
during the 1990s and 2000s triggered global market turmoil. The stock of tradable emerging
market debt grew by 17% per annum since 2002 reaching 11.7 trillion U.S. dollars in 2011
(Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2012). Furthermore, emerging market bonds have recently
attracted large portfolio capital ﬂows due to their remarkable resilience during the 2008-2009
global ﬁnancial crisis and post-crisis relatively favorable risk-return characteristics; see, for
instance, IMF (2010) and JP Morgan (2012).
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on sovereign bond yield predictability
with a comprehensive in- and out-of-sample forecasting analysis for four relatively mature
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emerging markets: Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey. The goal is to test three novel
hypotheses that stem from extant ﬁnancial economic theory and evidence. The ﬁrst hypoth-
esis states that the current emerging-market credit spread curve alone is a suﬃcient statistic
to predict future credit spreads (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis is motivated by the rational
expectations theory of interest rates that has been widely scrutinized in the riskless debt
context. The main idea is that, since the credit spread curve embeds forward credit spreads,
it contains market expectations about future credit spreads.1 Likewise, popular aﬃne term-
structure models of riskless debt imply that all the necessary information to predict credit
spreads is impounded in the current credit spread curve. In order to test Hypothesis 1, we
specify a parsimonious (baseline) predictive model for future credit spreads that exploits
the information content of the credit spread curve alone; that is, the only predictors are the
current spread level, slope and curvature factors.
The second hypothesis is that indicators of uncertainty about global business conditions
and about the emerging borrower's future ability to repay debt convey additional information
about the future credit spread over and above the current credit spread curve (Hypothesis
2). To formally test this hypothesis, we deploy a hierarchical predictive regression approach
by which the baseline emerging-market credit spread curve model is gradually extended with
various predictors. Aligned with the ﬁrst part of the hypothesis, we consider as key global
macroeconomic indicators the U.S. interest rate curve factors that reﬂect expectations about
future global riskless rates and, more pertinently, the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest
rate that reﬂects uncertainty therein. The established wisdom is that, on the one hand,
global interest rates inﬂuence the country-speciﬁc default component of the credit spread.
Speciﬁcally, the U.S. interest rate inﬂuences domestic business conditions  it explains about
1Akin to the one-to-one relationship that exists between yields on pure discount bonds and current forward
interest rates for riskless bonds, credit spreads on defaultable bonds are linked to current forward spreads.
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20% of output variability in emerging markets (Uribe and Yue, 2006)  by determining the
borrowing costs faced by the sovereign. Through its signaling role about the global ﬁnancial
market conditions, on the other hand, the U.S. interest rate impacts on common factors such
as global market liquidity and investors' risk appetite and hence, it inﬂuences also the non-
default-related risk premium component of the credit spread (Hartelius et al., 2008; Longstaﬀ
et al., 2011). The volatility of the U.S. interest rate is therefore a natural candidate predictor
of uncertainty about both components of the emerging-market sovereign credit spread.
Next, as predictors to test Hypothesis 2 are two emerging economy's external sector
indicators: trade balance and terms of trade growth. Noting that our conjecture concerns
speciﬁcally the uncertainty about the emerging economy's ability to generate funds in hard
currencies for debt repayment, we assess the signaling ability of the volatility of trade balance
and terms of trade growth while controlling for the information content in their levels. The
motivation for this aspect of Hypothesis 2 stems from open-economy theory. The savings-
under-uncertainty neoclassical model of Mendoza (1997) states that the variability of the
terms of trade growth aﬀects output growth (positively or negatively depending on the level
of risk aversion) and reduces social welfare. The real business cycle model of Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) establishes that the variability of net exports is associated with productivity
trend growth shocks. In particular, trend growth shocks have been empirically linked to the
frequency of defaults in emerging markets (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006).
Third, we conjecture that emerging market sovereign bond spreads became more aligned
with global/domestic fundamentals post-Lehman (Hypothesis 3). This conjecture is inspired
by the notion of wake-up calls or learning eﬀects in ﬁnancial markets as originally put
forward by Goldstein et al. (2000) and Bekaert et al. (2011). A theoretical framework for
wake-up calls is recently oﬀered by Ahnert and Bertsch (2015) using global coordination
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games. Their model predicts that in calm market conditions investors may not have suﬃcient
incentives to acquire costly information about a market; consequently, this may induce some
divergence of the market prices from fundamentals. However, a crisis event in another market
induces investors to acquire information about the ﬁrst market and re-assess its fundamentals
even if investors learn that the two markets are unrelated to each other. Inspired by this
theory, we conjecture that the collapse of Lehman Brothers served as a wake-up call for
emerging-market sovereign bond investors, urging them to pay closer attention to the global
and domestic fundamentals that inﬂuence the sovereign's ability to repay debt.
Using cross-sections of individual bond prices per sovereign borrower sampled at the
weekly frequency from July 1, 2003 to December 31, 2013, we begin our analysis by estimating
the latent factors of the spread curve a` la Nelson and Siegel (1987). Given the limited cross-
section of bonds available, the relative parsimony of this approach is important to preserve
degrees of freedom in estimation and achieve as much accuracy as possible in the factor
extraction. For the same reason, we focus on four sovereigns with relatively large and liquid
markets for U.S. dollar denominated bonds spanning the typical maturity spectrum: Brazil,
Mexico, Philippines and Turkey.2 We make formal inferences using both in-sample and out-
of-sample (OOS) predictive ability tests. The horizon for the OOS forecasts is one quarter
ahead (in the context of our weekly data, h = 13 weeks).
We ﬁnd pervasive evidence that the emerging-market credit spread curve is not a suﬃ-
cient statistic for predicting the quarter-ahead spread, against Hypothesis 1, as the baseline
model forecasts are no better than those from the random walk and credit-slope benchmarks.
Adding the global riskless yield curve information reduces signiﬁcantly the model's in- and
out-of-sample predictive errors. The spread curve factors and the global riskless yield curve
2The cross-sections of bond prices available for other emerging markets that we could have included in
the analysis are notably smaller, particularly, in the early years of the sample period.
4
factors together constitute a superior predictive model that is able to beat the benchmarks.
Both in- and out-of-sample tests indicate that the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest
rate, the volatility of the emerging-market sovereign trade balance and terms-of-trade growth
are useful predictors of the quarter-ahead emerging market spread, in line with Hypothesis
2. These results provide insights that may help in reﬁning extant structural and reduced-
form models of emerging-market sovereign debt (Gibson and Sundaresan, 2005; Duﬃe et al.,
2003; Pan and Singleton, 2008). Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3 about the wake-
up call eﬀect of the Lehman Brothers' collapse on emerging-market debt markets, we ﬁnd
superior in- and out-of-sample predictive ability of most global and domestic macroeconomic
indicators after this negative event. We interpret this ﬁnding as evidence that credit spreads
became closer aligned with fundamentals post-Lehman.
Related Literature. Our paper relates to a very sparse literature on the OOS predictability
of emerging-market sovereign credit spreads. To our knowledge, there are only two studies
in this spirit broadly speaking. Sueppel (2005) predicts the cointegration path of the spread
on the Merril Lynch Emerging Market Bond index. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) construct
a hazard model for forecasting the sovereign's default probability using the J.P. Morgan
Emerging Markets Bond Index Global index;3 they utilize the default probability forecasts
to construct hazard-model-implied spreads. Our paper distinguishes itself from these two
studies in various aspects. First, the target variable is diﬀerent. We seek to predict an
observable variable, the sovereign credit spread, at a relatively short (quarter ahead) horizon
whereas Sueppel (2005) is interested instead in the latent long-run equilibrium path of the
spread. Unlike Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) that focus on the default component of the
3Focusing on the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index as debt portfolio, Comelli (2012) estimates
a model of emerging-market sovereign credit spreads based on credit risk ratings and global factors such as
the VIX volatility index, and U.S. interest rates, but they do not assess the OOS predictability of spreads.
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spread, we aim to predict the entire spread that comprises a default risk related component
and a non-default related risk premium; the latter is sizeable and non-negligible (see, e.g.,
Longstaﬀ et al., 2011). Second, our predictability analysis is based on disaggregated data
for bonds of short and long maturities instead of relying on an index (that pools bonds of
diﬀerent maturities) as proxy for a country's debt portfolio. Finally, these two predictive
studies are not concerned with the term structure; namely, they do not analyze the OOS
predictive content of the sovereign credit spread curve or the global riskless yield curve.
Our paper builds on contributions in the riskless bond yield predictability literature.
Diebold and Li (2006), Diebold et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2011) show that the
interest rate curve conveys information about future interest rates. Ang and Piazzesi (2003),
Moench (2008), and Ludvigson and Ng (2009) show that U.S. macroeconomic indicators carry
additional information content for future U.S. Treasury bond yields. There is a vacuum of
knowledge on these issues, however, in the context of risky debt. The one extant contribution
is Khrishnan et al. (2010) but their focus is instead the corporate bond market. They provide
evidence that the credit spread curve is not a suﬃcient statistic to predict future corporate
credit spreads since the riskless yield curve adds signiﬁcant predictive accuracy.
Our paper is evidently related to the literature that investigates the drivers of emerging-
market sovereign credit spreads. The established wisdom is that both global factors (e.g.,
Uribe and Yue, 2006; Hartelius et al., 2008; Longstaﬀ et al., 2011) and domestic macroeco-
nomic indicators (e.g., Edwards, 1986; Min, 1998; Ferrucci, 2003; Baldacci et al., 2008) play
a role. However, a common feature of these papers is that they do not analyze the OOS
predictive ability of the drivers. This is an important extension of our paper because good
in-sample model ﬁt and signiﬁcance from standard tests is not tantamount to useful OOS
predictive ability. The intuition is that typical model estimation approaches using all avail-
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able sample data are, by construction, avoiding large in-sample prediction errors and thus
susceptible to over-ﬁtting (mistaking noise for signal in the data). An OOS forecasting anal-
ysis of this nature is not only relevant for investors but it can also inform the development
of theoretical models of emerging-market sovereign debt.
Finally, our paper speaks to a still sparse literature that has adduced evidence of wake-
up calls in bond markets. In the context of Eurozone sovereign debt markets, Caceres et al.
(2010), Mink and Haan (2013) and Saka et al. (2015) show that, while early in the crisis the
spreads largely reﬂected changes in global risk aversion, at a later stage domestic macroe-
conomic fundamentals began to matter more; the stronger role played by the fundamentals
is observed not only for Eurozone countries severely aﬀected by the crisis but also for other
countries in the region. Our paper distinguishes itself from these studies not only in its focus
on emerging-market sovereign bond markets but also in that we shed light on the wake-up
call notion from the diﬀerent lens of OOS predictability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the predictive models while Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology
2.1 Emerging market zero-coupon credit spreads
The time t price of a zero-coupon bond that pays $1 at t+ τ obeys the relation
pi,t (τ) = e
−yi,t(τ)τ (1)
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where i denotes the sovereign bond issuer, and yi,t (τ) is the yield to maturity τ . The target
variable in our predictability analysis is the emerging market zero-coupon bond yield spread
si,t (τ) ≡ yi,t (τ)− yf,t (τ) (2)
where yf,t(τ) is the time t yield on a U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond. We extract at the
weekly frequency the unsmoothed yields on zero-coupon riskless bonds by applying the Fama
and Bliss (1987) methodology to cross-sections of market prices of U.S. Treasuries.4 The un-
smoothed Fama-Bliss yields price U.S. Treasuries exactly (see Diebold and Li, 2006). Next
we ﬁt the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson decomposition to those unsmoothed Fama-Bliss yields by
Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) to obtain the smoothed yields on zero-coupon riskless bonds
which are denoted yf,t (τ) in (2). The Nelson-Siegel-Svensson equation enables superior risk-
less bond yield estimation accuracy relative to simpler representations (see Svensson, 1994).
With these zero-coupon riskless bond yields in hand, we can construct the corresponding
emerging-market credit spreads on zero-coupon bonds, denoted si,t (τ), as follows.
We adopt the parsimonious Nelson and Siegel (1987) decomposition for the spread on
the (zero-coupon) maturity τ bond of the emerging-market sovereign i
si,t (τ) = βi0,t + βi1,t
(
1− e−λi,tτ
λi,tτ
)
+ βi2,t
(
1− e−λi,tτ
λi,tτ
− e−λi,tτ
)
(3)
where t = 1, 2, ..., T are sample weeks, βi0,t, βi1,t and βi2,t are the level, slope and curva-
ture factors, respectively. We extract these latent factors at the weekly frequency by NLS
minimization of the distance between the cross-section of observed coupon-paying emerging
market bond prices and the corresponding ﬁtted bond prices from eqs. (1)-(3) with exponen-
4We thank Robert Bliss for sharing his software and data ﬁles.
8
tial decay parameter ﬁxed at λi,t = 0.7308 (annualized yields), as in Diebold and Li (2006).
Then with the weekly spread factors in hand, βˆi0,t, βˆi1,t, βˆi2,t, t = 1, ..., T , we can construct
weekly zero-coupon emerging market bond spreads for any maturity, si,t(τ), using eq. (3).
2.2 Hierarchical predictive regressions
Following Diebold and Li (2006) and Khrishnan et al. (2010) in the riskless debt and risky
corporate debt contexts, respectively, we construct baseline forecasts for the h-week-ahead
spread as forward projections of the current spread curve using the predictive equation
si,t+h (τ) = αi + γi0βˆi0,t + γi1βˆi1,t + γi2βˆi2,t + εi,t+h, t = 1, 2, .., T. (4)
The parameters αi and γij, j = 0, 1, 2, are estimated by OLS using the weekly time-series of
emerging market spreads and spread curve factors.5 In a hierarchical regression approach,
we gradually add global macroeconomic factors, Gt, and formulate the predictive model
si,t+h (τ) = αi + γi0βˆi0,t + γi1βˆi0,t + γi2βˆi2,t + θ
G
i Gt + εi,t+h (5)
and emerging-market speciﬁc macroeconomic factors, EMi,t, leading to the predictive model
si,t+h (τ) = αi + γi0βˆi0,t + γi1βˆi0,t + γi2βˆi2,t + θ
G
i Gt + θ
EM
i EMi,t + εi,t+h, (6)
The predictive horizon is one-quarter-ahead (h = 13 weeks). We discuss the candidates for
global predictors, Gt, and domestic predictors, EMi,t, in the next section.
5Diebold and Li (2006) employ instead a two-step forecasting method by, ﬁrst, ﬁtting autoregressive
models (by OLS) to the estimated weekly factors to capture persistence, and then using the corresponding
projections, βˆij,t+h = f(βˆij,t), j = 0, 1, 2 as predictive variables in eq. (4).
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For the in-sample predictability analysis, equations (4)-(6) are estimated using the entire
sample (T weeks). For the OOS predictability analysis, we split the latter into an estimation
period (T0 = 2/3T weeks) and a holdout or evaluation period (T1 = 1/3T weeks). The
sequence of OOS forecasts is obtained by recursive estimation. The ﬁrst estimation window
spans week t = 1 up to week t = T0 and enables a ﬁrst h-week-ahead forecast sˆi,t+h|t (τ). The
next window, spanning weeks t = 1 to t = T0 + 1, enables a second forecast and so forth.
2.3 Evaluation of in- and out-of-sample predictive ability
We gauge the in-sample predictability gains in the hierarchical regression analysis through
the adjusted coeﬃcient of determination R2. A Wald test for block-exclusion restrictions
is conducted to assess the signiﬁcance of any predictability gain; the null hypothesis is
H0 : ∆AdjR
2 = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is HA : ∆AdjR
2 > 0.
We utilize the mean square error (MSE) statistic, which captures the expected value
of the squared error loss or quadratic loss, to measure the quality of the quarter-ahead
OOS forecasts sˆi,t(τ). Signiﬁcance will be assessed through the Clark and West (2007) one-
sided MSE-adjusted t-test. The relevant question in our hierarchical modeling approach
is: Does model B produce superior OOS forecasts than a simpler (nested) model A. Under
H0, model A is assumed to generate the data and therefore model B requires estimating
unnecessary parameters which introduces noise in the MSEB. Hence, the expected value
of the diﬀerential MSEA −MSEB is negative under H0; the adjustment of the Clark-West
test statistic is meant to account for this noise and the test hypotheses are formulated as
H0 : MSEA ≤MSEB against HA : MSEA > MSEB. Thus, a test rejection indicates that
the extended model B produces more accurate OOS forecasts than the nested model A.
A second set of OOS predictability tests is aimed at benchmarking. The idea is to assess
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whether our predictive regressions, eqs. (4)-(6), are able to beat those models employed as
benchmarks in the literature. Given the stylized persistence of credit spreads, a widely-used
benchmark is the random walk (RW) model sRWi,t+h|t (τ) = si,t (τ) + εi,t+h. Another natural
benchmark (inspired from the riskless bond predictability literature) is a time-series OLS
regression of credit spread changes on credit spread slopes, si,t+h (τ)−si,t(τ) = ci+di(si,t(τ)−
si,t(2)) + εi,t+h, where si,t(2) denotes the 2-year credit spread. This simple slope regression
follows the spirit of the forward-rate regressions of Fama and Bliss (1987) and Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005), and the term spread regression of Campbell and Shiller (1991), that have
been deployed as alternative tests of the rational expectations theory in the context of riskless
interest rates.6. Since this benchmarking involves comparing non-nested models, we employ
the Diebold and Mariano (1995) two-sided t-test which hypothesizesH0 : MSEb−MSEj = 0
against HA : MSEb − MSEj 6= 0, with the subscripts j and b denoting the candidate
predictive model and the benchmark at hand, respectively. Both sets of OOS predictive
ability tests are adjusted for autocorrelation in the weekly OOS forecast error sequence.
3 Credit Spreads and Predictors: Data Description
3.1 Bond market price data and preliminary analysis
The period of analysis is July 1, 2003 to December 31, 2013 and the sampling frequency
is weekly. The modeling and forecasting analysis will be conducted separately over a pre-
Lehman (268 weeks) period and a post-Lehman (263 weeks) period, for comparison.7 The
data set used for the riskless zero-coupon bond yield extraction and corresponding term-
6For further discussion, see Diebold and Li (2006) and Steeley (2014)
7The ﬁrst period is July 1, 2003 to October 14, 2008. Excluding the anomalous weeks immediately
following the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, the second period is December 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013.
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structure curve ﬁtting are midweek bid-ask average price quotes for U.S. Treasury bonds
from the Center for Research in Security Prices. Over 100 prices are available per week.
In order to collect emerging market bond prices, we establish various eligibility criteria
geared towards achieving reliable term-structure estimation. The ﬁrst requirement is the
availability in each sample week of market price data on at least six Eurobond issues across
a range of bond maturities (from 1 to 32 years). The minimum amount at issue is $500 million
to mitigate illiquidity. Since relatively few emerging market Eurobonds with maturity below
3 years or above 20 years are observed on a trading day, to mitigate illiquidity also the
analysis is conﬁned to 3-20 year maturities. The pool of eligible sovereign bonds per country
is further ﬁltered to retain only plain vanilla bond issues, with ﬁxed regular coupon payments
and without collateral, sink funds or other special contractual aspects.8
Thus we end up with histories of midweek bid-ask average price quotes for U.S. dollar
denominated Eurobonds of four emerging market sovereigns  Brazil, Mexico, Philippines
and Turkey. The primarily data source is Bloomberg. We use Datastream as supplementary
data source to fulﬁll our requirement of at least six market bond prices observed on any
given week; 19% of our emerging-market sovereign bond prices come from Datastream. The
week-by-week spread curve ﬁtting described in Section 2.1 is thus based on cross-sections of
between 9 and 21 (6 and 17) bond prices for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey (Philippines).
The empirical distribution of the bond pricing error (observed bond price minus ﬁtted
bond price for a $100 bond) pooled across maturities and weeks has a mean value of less
8CDS contracts would be a convenient alternative to obviate the extraction of zero-coupon bond yields.
But CDS markets are still relatively illiquid at both short and long maturities for the sovereigns of interest
here. Ammer and Cai (2007) provide empirical evidence that the relative liquidity of the two markets is a
key determinant of where price discovery occurs and document that bond spreads lead CDS premiums for
many emerging sovereign borrowers. CDS contracts include various conditions too and it has been shown,
for instance, that the cheapest-to-deliver option aﬀects the CDS spread (Ammer and Cai, 2007). Pan and
Singleton (2008) emphasize the liquidity of the underlying bond market as a key determinant of the CDS
market liquidity because traders hedge their CDS positions with cash market instruments; a relatively less
liquid cash market leads to high hedging costs and, consequently, high bid/ask spreads in the CDS market.
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than 2 cents for U.S. Treasuries and between 6 and 13 cents for emerging market bonds.
The dispersion of the distribution, given by the standard deviation, is 30 cents for the U.S.
market, and between 65 and 130 cents for emerging markets. These pricing errors compare
well with those reported in similar studies of speculative and low investment-grade bonds
such as Elton et al. (2001) and Khrishnan et al. (2010).
Figure 1 shows the emerging-market spread curves from 3- to 20-year maturity obtained
week by week. To preserve space, hereafter the discussion is conﬁned to a short (5-year)
maturity and a long (15-year) maturity.9 Various stylized facts are conﬁrmed by the summary
statistics for the weekly credit spreads and spread curve factors given in Table 1.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
[Insert Table 1 around here]
The credit spread curves exhibit time and cross-section heterogeneity. The common
time-variation reﬂects the global business cycle. For instance, the curves decline during
the 2003-2006 period of favorable global ﬁnancial conditions and ample liquidity. This is
followed by a moderate rise in spreads during the turbulent 2007-2008 period. In October
2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy), all four spread curves shift upwards sharply.
The credit spread curves are mainly upward-sloping. The slope somewhat declines post-
Lehman reﬂecting the start of a global recovery. Consistent with a slow improvement in
global fundamentals and relatively stable country-speciﬁc economic conditions, the time
variation in the credit curve level and slope, captured by the standard deviation of the
estimated β0,t and β1,t, also lessens post-Lehman (Table 1). The ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
coeﬃcient of the credit spreads conﬁrms the stylized persistence of credit spreads.10
9We analyzed the predictability of emerging market sovereign spreads for 3, 10, and 20-year maturity
bonds also, and the ﬁndings are broadly aligned with those discussed here; details are available upon request.
10Credit spreads are theoretically conceptualized as realizations from persistent but stationary processes.
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Cross-section heterogeneity in the credit spread curves is also evident, especially, at the
beginning of the sample period when the S&P's rating agency assigned a low speculative
grade B rating to Brazil and Turkey, a higher speculative grade BB rating to Philippines,
while Mexico was rated investment grade BBB. Brazil's rating improved to BB on September
17, 2004 and later to BBB on April 30, 2008. Turkey experienced only a modest upgrade to
BB, remaining in the speculative grade whereas Philippines was upgraded to the investment
grade BBB on May 2, 2013. Mexico's rating remained unchanged.
3.2 Global macroeconomic predictors
Our hierarchical regression approach starts by constructing quarter-ahead spread predictions
from the credit spread curve model (4). Then we test the in- and out-of-sample predictability
gains, and relative benchmarking ability by augmenting it with various other predictors.
Among the global macroeconomic indicators, the ﬁrst natural candidates are the level,
slope, and curvature factors (βf0,t,βf1,t, βf2,t)
′
that jointly summarize the information con-
tent of the global riskless yield curve.11 The motivation is twofold. First, through its impact
on domestic business conditions, the global interest rate inﬂuences the emerging economy's
future ability to repay external debt. The current global riskless yield curve is thus likely to
convey information about the future default-risk related component of the emerging market
sovereign spread.12 Empirically, it has been shown that U.S. interest rate shocks are respon-
sible for about 20% of ﬂuctuations in an emerging economy's aggregate activity, and the
transmission mechanism occurs mainly through the country's credit spread that determines
11Following Diebold and Li (2006), we ﬁt the Nelson and Siegel (1987) decomposition to the unsmoothed
Fama-Bliss yields on zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds to obtain the three latent factors.
12In the neoclassical growth model of Uribe and Yue (2006), a positive U.S. interest rate shock contracts
the emerging economy's output and investment. The small open economy model of Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) contends that shocks to the U.S. interest rate inﬂuence emerging-market business conditions. The
structural sovereign debt model of Gibson and Sundaresan (2005) predicts a counter-cyclical relationship
between the global business cycle, which is signaled by the global interest rate, and the credit spread.
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the borrowing cost that the country faces in international markets (Uribe and Yue, 2006).
Second, the global interest rate inﬂuences global liquidity conditions and investors' risk
appetite. These, in turn, aﬀect the demand for emerging-market bonds, and other asset
classes, versus riskless bonds and therefore the (non-default) emerging market risk premium
component of the spread (Hartelius et al., 2008; Ciarlone et al., 2009; Longstaﬀ et al.,
2011). In other words, the U.S. Treasury bond yield reﬂects the monetary policy path of
the Federal Reserve which inﬂuences the capital re-allocation among asset classes globally
and the net capital ﬂows to emerging markets. For instance, expansionary U.S. monetary
policy together with a decrease in investors' risk aversion can fuel the search for yield which
leads to surges in the global demand for emerging market bonds and lower spreads; tighter
monetary conditions in major economies and a drying up of global liquidity can reverse the
capital ﬂows and increase the spreads (Hartelius et al., 2008; Ciarlone et al., 2009). It has
been shown empirically that the U.S. Treasury yield curve contains predictive information
for future U.S. Treasury bond yields and for risky corporate credit spreads (Diebold and Li,
2006 and Khrishnan et al., 2010, respectively.)
Our next candidate predictor is the U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, denoted σshortf,t
and measured at the weekly frequency (on each week t = 1, 2..., T of the sample period) as the
standard deviation of the daily 1-year U.S. Treasury bond yield over the most recent 10-day
trading window. Greater uncertainty about the monetary policy of major economies (global
business conditions) as signaled by higher U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, poses a chal-
lenge for international investors regarding ﬁnancial risk allocation decisions (e.g., Hartelius
et al., 2008; Arora and Cerisola, 2001). Higher U.S. short-term interest rate volatility also im-
plies greater uncertainty about global liquidity which is likely to widen the emerging market
spread. Figure A1 (Panel I) in the on-line Addendum visually illustrates this point through
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time-series graphs of the weekly 5-year credit spreads, si,t(5), i={Mexico, Turkey}, alongside
the 13-week-lagged U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, σshortf,t−13. The post-Lehman sample
correlation coeﬃcient between the two variables is large and positive ranging across the four
countries between 0.60 and 0.80 (0.62 and 0.79) for the 5- (15-) year credit spreads.13
The global factors are added to the baseline model in a two-step hierarchical fashion
leading to the following formulations of equation (5): model G1 with the global predictors
Gt ≡ (βf0,t, βf1,t, βf2,t)
′
, and model G2 with Gt ≡
(
βf0,t, βf1,t, βf2,t;σ
short
f,t
)′
. The sample
distribution of all four global macroeconomic indicators is summarized in Table 1.
3.3 Domestic macroeconomic predictors
Extant business cycle theory and evidence suggest that an emerging-market sovereign's ex-
ternal sector conveys information about its economic conditions which, in turn, drives future
credit spreads. Traditional wisdom says that the sovereign's trade balance signals its ability
to generate funds in hard currencies for servicing external debt and the volatility of trade
balance signals uncertainty thereof. The small-open-economy model of Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) decomposes the real interest rate into two components, international rate and country
risk, and suggests that net exports are more strongly counter-cyclical in emerging markets
than in developed ones. There is evidence for emerging-market economies that a greater
trade balance is associated with output, consumption and investment contraction (Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2007; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005).
In the real business cycle model for an emerging economy of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007),
trend shocks to productivity growth are the key driver of economic growth, and the volatility
13By contrast, pre-Lehman the correlations between the country spreads and 13-week-lagged volatility of
the riskless short-term interest rate are much lower, ranging across countries between -0.32 and -0.13 (-0.22
and -0.05) for the 5- (15-) year bonds.
16
of trade balance is informative about the relative weight of trend versus temporary shocks.
This aligns well with the ﬁnding that trend shocks to productivity growth can quantitatively
match the frequency of defaults in emerging economies (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006).
Accordingly, we assess the in- and out-of-sample predictive ability (for the quarter-ahead
spread) of the trade balance, denoted TBi,t, which represents the month t exports minus im-
ports over GDP in US$, and the volatility of trade balance (σTBi,t ) measured as the standard
deviation of TBi,t over the most recent 6-month window. The data are obtained from Datas-
tream. We interpolate the monthly TBi,t and σ
TB
i,t measures to weekly. The link between
country credit spreads, si,t(τ), and lagged trade balance volatility, σ
TB
i,t−13, can be informally
gleaned from the time-series plots in Figure A1 (Panel II) of the on-line Addendum.
It is also known that terms-of-trade shocks aﬀect economic activity mainly through ﬂuc-
tuations in the price of energy and other commodities. In the context of emerging economies,
the eﬀect is ampliﬁed by specialization in commodity exports, dependence on imported cap-
ital goods, and limited access to global ﬁnancial markets (Chen and Rogoﬀ, 2003; Mendoza,
1995; Sachs, 1981; IMF, 1991). Previous research has linked current terms-of trade-growth
and future sovereign default risk (Bulow and Rogoﬀ, 1989; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010).
The savings-under-uncertainty neoclassical model of Mendoza (1997) formalizes the posi-
tive link between terms-of-trade changes and economic growth, and indicates that high terms-
of-trade growth variability can impair economic growth and reduce social welfare. Extant
empirical research has shown that not only the terms-of-trade growth but also its volatility
are signiﬁcant determinant of future emerging market sovereign default risk (Hilscher and
Nosbusch, 2010). These considerations motivate us to examine the in- and out-of-sample
forecasting ability of terms-of-trade growth (∆TTi,t) and volatility of terms-of-trade growth
(σ∆TTi,t ) as predictors of the quarter-ahead spreads. ∆TTi,t is measured on each sample month
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t as the annual percentage change in the US$ price of the country's exports relative to the
US$ price of its imports; σ∆TTi,t is the standard deviation of ∆TTi,t over the most recent
6-month window. The data are from Datastream. Again the monthly ∆TTi,t and σ
∆TT
i,t mea-
sures are interpolated to weekly. Given that direct measures of emerging-market business
conditions are only available to a forecaster with delays, our empirical analysis can shed light
on whether the trade balance and terms-of-trade growth (in levels and volatility) are useful
proxies of those economic conditions for the real-time prediction of quarter-ahead spreads.
Finally, for completeness, we entertain as predictor the emerging-market ﬁnancial risk
rating (referred to as country rating, CR, for simplicity hereafter) provided by the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide of the Political Risk Services Group which directly signals the
more imminent ability of a sovereign to pay oﬀ external debt. Not surprisingly, the CR has
been contemporaneously linked to the credit spread (e.g., Audzeyeva and Schenk-Hoppe,
2010; Csonto and Ivaschenko, 2013). The CR captures risks related to the deterioration in
various foreign debt related indicators: foreign debt to GDP, foreign debt service to exports,
current account to exports, oﬃcial reserves as months of imports and exchange rate sta-
bility.14 These indicators and the resulting CR ought to be quickly impounded into bond
prices (and spreads) as they are closely monitored by investors and therefore, they may not
convey information for the future spread. Nevertheless, given the prominence of the CR in
the empirical emerging-market debt modeling literature, all our predictive equations with
emerging-market external sector variables include also the CR as control variable.
Accordingly, we begin by adding the emerging-market country rating to the model at
hand, G1, and formulate model GEM1. Then we add the trade balance to obtain GEM2,
14The foreign debt related indicators behind the CR have been shown to maintain a contemporaneous
relationship with credit spreads in Min (1998) and Eichengreen and Mody (1998) inter alia. The CRs are
measured in a 050 scale and updated monthly. The detailed CR construction is described in Csonto and
Ivaschenko (2013) and http://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg.
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the volatility of trade balance to obtain GEM3. Finally, model GEM4 adds terms-of-trade
growth, and GEM5 adds the volatility of terms-of-trade growth. Summary statistics for these
emerging-market external sector variables and country rating are provided in Table 1. The
full list of predictive models built in this hierarchical fashion is shown in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
4 Empirical results
4.1 Within-sample predictive ability
The baseline credit spread factor model and the two successive extensions with global factors,
models G1 and G2, are compared in Table 3 on the basis of their in-sample predictive power.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
On average across countries and both time periods (pre- and post-Lehman), the incre-
mental in-sample predictive power aﬀorded by the U.S. yield curve factors (∆AdjR2G1 ≡
AdjR2G1−AdjR2base) is 10.2 and 7.5 percentage points (pp) for 5- and 15-year maturity bonds
respectively, with no discernible diﬀerence pre- and post-Lehman. The Wald tests (the null
hypothesis is that the coeﬃcients of the additional predictors are jointly zero) suggest that
the predictive gains are signiﬁcant.15 This ﬁnding represents evidence against Hypothesis
1 that the credit spread curve is a suﬃcient statistic to predict the future spread. Adding
the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest rate enhances the average in-sample predictive
15The Wald tests are based on the standard asymptotic (chi-square) distribution. Hence, they do not
account for regressor uncertainty or the fact that the level, slope and curvature factors are estimated. We
measured the correlation between the weekly RMSEs of the cross-section ﬁtted Nelson-Siegel equation (3)
and the weekly residuals of the time-series regression equation (4). The value is small at 0.089 on average
across countries, sub-periods and maturities which indirectly suggests that the test distortions are trivial.
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ability (∆AdjR2G2 ≡ AdjR2G2 − AdjR2G1) by 2.4pp and 2.7pp, respectively. However, in con-
trast with the U.S. yield curve factors, a notable contrast pre- and post-Lehman is observed
regarding the additional predictive ability aﬀorded by the volatility of the U.S. interest rate;
∆Adj.R2G2 reaches only 1.3pp and 0.8pp pre-Lehman but 3.4pp and 4.6pp post-Lehman for
the 5- and 15-year bonds, respectively. This evidence supports Hypothesis 3 on the wake-
upeﬀect of the Lehman Brother's bankruptcy.
Next we assess the in-sample predictability gains aﬀorded by domestic macroeconomic
variables (∆AdjR2GEMj) and their signiﬁcance (Wald test). Table 4 reports the results.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
At both the short- and long-end of the bond maturity spectrum, the country-speciﬁc ex-
ternal sector indicators aﬀord signiﬁcant in-sample predictive gains, especially post-Lehman.
Most prominently, on average across countries the volatility of trade balance as predictor
enhances predictive power (∆AdjR2GEM3 ≡ AdjR2GEM3−AdjR2GEM2) by 0.4pp and 1.2pp pre-
Lehman and 1.4pp and 1.9pp post-Lehman for 5- and 15-year maturity bonds, respectively.
At country level, trade balance is highly informative for Philippines and Turkey, terms-of-
trade growth for Brazil and Turkey, and volatility of terms-of-trade growth for Brazil.
Country rating is the exceptional predictor whose role decreases post-Lehman on average
across countries and bond maturities (∆R2GEM1 ≡ AdjR2GEM1 − AdjR2G2 < 0). At country
level, this ﬁnding is most prominent in Brazil, Mexico and Philippines, and absent in the
relatively small Turkish bond market. What is the intuition? First, the CR has predictive
content for the quarter-ahead credit spread in the pre-Lehman period which indicates that the
CR information is not quickly impounded into bond prices. Second, the quarter-ahead pre-
dictive content in the CR vanishes post-Lehman, an indirect reﬂection of a dramatic change
in the emerging-market bond price discovery process which becomes then more eﬃcient; this
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evidence is also consistent with Hypothesis 3. Table A1 in the on-line Addendum reports the
OLS estimation results for the baseline model and selected (to preserve space) extensions
thereof obtained hierarchically by adding global/domestic macroeconomic predictors.
4.2 Out-of-sample predictive ability
Since in-sample predictive ability does not necessarily translate into out-of-sample (OOS)
or real-time predictive ability, the next important task is to assess the latter. In the pre-
Lehman analysis, we construct 92 quarter-ahead OOS spread forecasts based on expanding
estimation windows; the ﬁrst forecast (based on an initial estimation window of 163 weeks)
corresponds to November 28, 2006 and the last one to October 14, 2008. In the post-Lehman
analysis, the number of OOS forecasts is 90; the ﬁrst forecast (based on an initial estimation
window of 160 weeks) is for March 27, 2012 and the last one for December 31, 2013.
Global macroeconomic indicators. The information content in the global riskless yield
curve enhances the OOS predictive ability as borne out by the small root mean square error
ratio of model G1 relative to the baseline model (i.e., RMSEG1/RMSEbase < 1) reported
in Table 5. This ﬁnding reinforces the in-sample predictive evidence against Hypothesis 1.
On average across countries, the reduction in forecast errors aﬀorded by the global riskless
yield curve (1 − RMSEG1/RMSEbase) is 1.2% and 2.9% pre-Lehman and a remarkably
larger 12.1% and 11.5% post-Lehman for the 5- and 15-year bonds, respectively. The one
exception is Brazil pre-Lehman where augmenting the model with the riskless yield curve
factors adds noise to the predictions (RMSEG1/RMSEbase > 1). To explain this contrasting
ﬁnding, we also notice a distinct sharp fall in the Brazilian credit spreads pre-Lehman.
Helped by favorable global market conditions and investors' search for yield, the dramatic
improvement in Brazil's credit rating from B in 2003 to BBB in 2008 may have resulted in
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over-conﬁdent investor sentiment towards Brazil that somewhat decoupled its spreads from
the levels consistent with the global interest rate.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Further adding the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest rate shrinks the forecast
errors (1 − RMSEG2/RMSEG1 > 0) on average across countries by -0.9% and 4.1% pre-
Lehman and by 6.4% and 5.6% post-Lehman for the 5- and 15-year bonds, respectively. The
Clark and West (2007; CW) tests unambiguously conﬁrm that this global macroeconomic
uncertainty indicator adds signiﬁcant predictive content post-Lehman to the credit-spread
curve and riskless yield curve across the bond maturity spectrum.
Next we benchmark the baseline predictive model and its extensions with global macroe-
conomic indicators (models G1 and G2) against the random walk and slope-regression. The
results are set up in Table 6. Reported RMSE ratios below unity indicate that the candidate
model gives more accurate forecasts than the benchmark. Signiﬁcance is assessed with the
Diebold and Mariano (1995) two-sided t-test statistic for non-nested models. A signiﬁcant
and positive DM statistic indicates that the candidate model outperforms the benchmark.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
The baseline model (4) almost never beats both benchmarks, neither pre-Lehman nor
post-Lehman; the exception is Turkey post-Lehman when both benchmarks are outperformed
by the credit curve model at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Exploiting the information in the
global riskless yield curve reduces the forecast errors enough for model G1 to be able to
outperform both benchmarks post-Lehman, with some exceptions (Brazil 5-year and 20-
year bonds, and Mexico 5-year bonds). It is only when the volatility of the U.S. short-term
interest rate is added to the predictors set that for all countries and bond maturities the
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resulting modelG2 beats both benchmarks post-Lehman. In the pre-Lehman period, in sharp
contrast, models G1 and G2 generally fail to outperform both benchmarks. These ﬁndings
altogether represent further evidence against Hypothesis 1 about the informativeness of the
credit spread curve alone, but provide support for the wake-up call Hypothesis 3.
As a robustness check, we reformulated the predictive regressions substituting the ﬁrst
three Principal Components (PCs) of the credit spreads and the U.S. Treasury yields, re-
spectively, for the level, slope and curvature of the country credit spread curve and the global
riskless yield curve.16 The resulting RMSE ratios and signiﬁcance statistics do not challenge
the above ﬁndings, and are not reported to preserve space (available upon request).
Domestic macroeconomic indicators. Our ﬁnal task is to elucidate the marginal OOS
predictive ability of the country rating and external sector variables. In the spirit of our
hierarchical regression approach, we confront model GEM1 with the prior (nested) model
G2, model GEM2 with GEM1, and so forth. Table 7 reports the results.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Consistent with the in-sample predictability ﬁndings, the country rating stands in con-
trast with the external sector variables due to its weaker OOS predictive power post-Lehman.
The error reduction (1−RMSEGEM1/RMSEG2) is 5.0% and 6.2% pre-Lehman versus -3.8%
and 1.3% post-Lehman on average across countries for the 5- and 15-year bonds, respectively.
The information content in the volatility of trade balance signiﬁcantly improves the OOS
forecasts for short- and long-term maturity bond spreads, especially post-Lehman; the only
exception is Philippines. On average across Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, a post-Lehman
forecast error reduction (1−RMSEGEM3/RMSEGEM2 > 0) of 8.2% and 11.4% is achieved
16At weekly frequency, we extract the PCs of credit spreads on zero-coupon bonds of 3, 4,..., 20 year
maturity and yields on U.S. zero-coupon bonds of 1, 2,..., 20 year maturity.
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for the 5- and 15-year credit spreads, respectively. Again post-Lehman only, the information
content in the volatility of terms-of-trade growth improves the accuracy of forecasts (1 −
RMSEGEM5/RMSEGEM4 > 0) for the Brazil short- and long-term bond spreads and the
Mexico short-term bond spreads. These distinctive results for Brazil and Mexico are plausible
given that both countries are highly reliant on commodity exports.
The absence of evidence on the predictive role of external trade volatility indicators for
Philippines is not surprising. To begin with, terms-of-trade data is unavailable for Philip-
pines over most of the sample period which precludes the study of the predictive models
GEM4 and GEM5; hence, we cannot draw inferences on the predictive content of the
Philippines volatility of terms-of-trade growth indicator. According to the Eurobond market
size, Philippines is notably smaller than Brazil, Mexico and Turkey.17 Smaller bond market
size is generally associated with higher market frictions such as the cost of trading due to
lower trading volumes and lesser liquidity, and also with higher information costs. These
sovereign bond market frictions may hinder predictability by obscuring the nexus between
the current credit spread and past country's macroeconomic fundamentals.
The level of trade balance and terms-of-trade growth exhibit also less predictive ability pre-
than post-Lehman, consistent with Hypothesis 3. However, their overall predictive ability is
less remarkable than that of the volatility of trade balance and terms-of-trade growth. The
forecast error change aﬀorded by the trade balance level (1 − RMSEGEM2/RMSEGEM1)
is either positive but statistically insigniﬁcant or negative. The information in the level of
terms-of-trade growth helps to reduce the forecast error (1−RMSEGEM4/RMSEGEM3 > 0)
for Brazil and Turkey at about 5.0% altogether but only regarding the 15-year bonds.
17Many sovereign emerging Eurobond markets, including new or historically small markets, expanded
considerably during 2003-2013. For instance, external ﬁnancing of new bond issuance measured by the four-
year total (in billions US$) tripled or even quadrupled from $40.7, $30.3, and $19.2 in 2000-2003 to $168.9,
$119.2, and $53.5 in 2010-2013 for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, respectively (IMF, 2004, and IMF, 2014). In
contrast, Philippines' new issuance expanded only very moderately from $12.9 to $18.0 billion.
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Finally, we benchmark the OOS predictions. The results are reported in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
During the pre-Lehman period, the extended models with country rating and external
sector variables generally fail to outperform the two benchmarks. In sharp contrast, post-
Lehman the same models beat the benchmarks. The only exception is the Mexico 5-year
credit spread for which the model forecasts fail to beat the random-walk post-Lehman.
Further investigation suggests that this anomalous result is to a large extent an artefact of the
noise introduced by the irrelevant CR variable (which is statistically insigniﬁcant according
to Wald tests, as shown in the on-line Addendum Table A1). The parallel benchmarking
results for the extended models with domestic macroeconomic predictors (GEM2 to GEM5)
but without the CR as control variable are shown in the on-line Addendum Table A2.18
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an entirely new perspective on emerging-market sovereign credit spreads
by conducting a comprehensive within-sample and out-of-sample predictability analysis. The
investigation is organized around three hypotheses which have implications for policy-makers
and bond investors. Hypothesis 1 states that the current spread curve is a suﬃcient statistic
to predict future spreads. Building on extant theoretical and empirical contributions, we
conjecture that the volatility of global and domestic macroeconomic indicators contains
valuable information content about future sovereign credit spreads over and above that
conveyed by the current sovereign spread curve (Hypothesis 2). Building on the notion of
18In line with the in-sample analysis, the OOS predictive ﬁndings are robust to the use of the ﬁrst three
Principal Components of credit spreads and U.S. bond yields instead of the corresponding Nelson-Siegel
level, slope and curvature factors. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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wake-up calls in ﬁnancial markets, Hypothesis 3 states that emerging-market sovereign
credit spreads became more closely aligned with fundamentals post-Lehman.
To formally test these hypotheses, we estimate dynamic models for Brazil, Mexico, Philip-
pines and Turkey with weekly data over two periods surrounding the Lehman Brothers'
bankruptcy. Formal statistical tests of a model's out-of-sample forecast performance are
conducted by splitting each of the two periods (pre- and post-Lehman) into an in-sample
period, used for the initial parameter estimation, and an out-of-sample period, used to eval-
uate forecast accuracy. The forecast horizon is one quarter (thirteen weeks) ahead and the
out-of-sample forecasts are constructed recursively through expanding estimation windows.
The baseline model that exploits solely the information content in the current credit
spread curve is unable to outperform the canonical random walk and slope-regression bench-
marks. Successively adding global and country-speciﬁc macroeconomic variables produces
superior forecasts. This novel ﬁnding for emerging market debt refutes Hypothesis 1 and
aligns well with extant evidence for riskless debt, questioning the assumptions of aﬃne
term-structure models. We conclude that the predictability of future bond yields cannot be
completely ascribed to information latent in the cross-section of current yields.
Volatility measures that signal uncertainty either about the global economic outlook or
the borrower's future ability to repay debt carry useful information content about future
emerging-market credit spreads, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Uncertainty measures there-
fore should be of concern to policy-makers and market participants. Overall we also see
signiﬁcantly greater predictive ability of global and country-speciﬁc macroeconomic indica-
tors post-Lehman which, consistent with the wake-up call Hypothesis 3, suggests that the
pricing of emerging market bonds became then more closely aligned with fundamentals.
The out-of-sample predictability perspective on emerging-market credit spreads adopted
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in this paper, namely, the construction and evaluation of forecasts over future time peri-
ods not used in the model parameter estimation, is relevant for various reasons. Empirical
evidence based on out-of-sample and in-sample forecast performance is generally consid-
ered more trustworthy than evidence based on in-sample performance alone, which can be
more sensitive to outliers and data mining. Out-of-sample forecasts also better reﬂect the
information available to the forecaster in real time. Emerging-market spreads, signifying
international borrowing costs, inﬂuence domestic business conditions which, in turn, feed
into spreads via the default-risk component. A deeper understanding of the real-time pre-
dictability of country spreads can help world policy-makers to contain excessive business cycle
ﬂuctuations in emerging-market sovereigns and assist investors in ﬁnancial risk allocation.
Our ﬁndings endorse policies aimed at promoting emerging-market stability by keeping
the volatility of U.S. monetary policy low. They also promote policies aimed at sustaining
long-term growth in emerging economies by stabilizing their net exports and terms-of-trade
growth. Such long-term macroeconomic risk management via institutional and policy change
is promoted in Gray and Malone (2008). Our ﬁndings also endorse the proposition made by
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), Caballero (2003) and Merton (2005) that sovereign borrowers
should consider innovative ﬁnancial instruments to hedge macroeconomic risk exposures.
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(a) Brazil       (b) Mexico 
   
(c) Philippines                           (d) Turkey 
 
FIG.1. Emerging market credit spreads 
Each panel plots country credit spread curves estimated at weekly frequency from July 1, 2003 to December 31, 
2013 with cross-sections of daily Eurobond prices using the Nelson-Siegel decomposition. 
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      TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CREDIT SPREADS AND PREDICTIVE VARIABLES 
         
The table reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and first-order autocorrelation of credit 
spreads for 5- and 15-year bonds, and candidate predictors. The betas are level, slope and curvature factors of 
the U.S. yield curve (US) and credit spread curve extracted from daily cross-sections of bond prices sampled 
at the weekly frequency. σf short is the standard deviation of the daily U.S. short-term interest rate over the most 
recent 10-day period. Monthly macroeconomic data is converted into weekly using linear interpolation. CR is 
country rating. TB is trade balance. ∆TT is year-on-year terms of trade growth. σTB (σ∆TT) is the standard 
deviation of TB (∆TT) over the most recent 6-month period. The pre-Lehman period is July 1, 2003 to October 
14, 2008 (268 weeks) and the post-Lehman period is December 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013 (263 weeks).  
Variable
β f ,0 0.054 0.005 0.045 0.067 0.978 0.045 0.008 0.029 0.058 0.981
β f ,1 -0.014 0.019 -0.054 0.010 0.994 -0.027 0.015 -0.053 -0.004 0.981
β f ,2 -0.043 0.023 -0.096 -0.006 0.970 -0.091 0.017 -0.139 -0.048 0.942
σ f
short 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.965 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.933
ѕ(5) 0.028 0.018 0.006 0.080 0.978 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.050 0.939
ѕ(15) 0.036 0.020 0.010 0.096 0.980 0.019 0.007 0.010 0.045 0.938
β 0 0.040 0.022 0.012 0.103 0.980 0.021 0.006 0.012 0.041 0.930
β 1 -0.036 0.025 -0.103 0.017 0.968 -0.014 0.014 -0.041 0.023 0.843
β 2 -0.012 0.032 -0.078 0.090 0.929 -0.010 0.031 -0.107 0.069 0.903
CR 35.951 3.012 29.000 39.500 0.985 39.806 3.247 32.500 45.500 0.972
TB 0.333 0.116 0.055 0.560 0.990 0.079 0.062 -0.112 0.233 0.975
σ TB 0.051 0.017 0.024 0.106 0.980 0.043 0.015 0.021 0.090 0.980
∆ TT 2.393 2.825 -2.834 8.759 0.982 2.793 8.502 -8.580 18.965 0.998
σ ∆ TT 2.128 0.657 0.969 4.491 0.960 3.277 1.789 0.499 9.054 0.991
ѕ(5) 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.935 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.047 0.933
ѕ(15) 0.017 0.005 0.008 0.031 0.958 0.019 0.006 0.011 0.045 0.923
β 0 0.021 0.006 0.010 0.039 0.958 0.020 0.006 0.013 0.044 0.903
β 1 0.001 0.015 -0.039 0.040 0.848 -0.014 0.011 -0.044 0.008 0.790
β 2 -0.047 0.027 -0.114 0.022 0.852 -0.005 0.020 -0.062 0.063 0.795
CR 40.364 1.750 36.000 42.000 0.985 40.561 1.844 35.500 43.000 0.971
TB -0.076 0.057 -0.287 0.048 0.964 -0.023 0.061 -0.272 0.085 0.946
σ TB 0.044 0.023 0.010 0.102 0.979 0.052 0.022 0.024 0.131 0.980
∆ TT 3.583 3.487 -3.342 10.567 0.992 -0.117 9.904 -21.839 18.538 0.990
σ ∆ TT 2.065 0.748 0.909 4.080 0.985 4.788 3.565 0.994 14.547 0.987
ѕ(5) 0.026 0.010 0.008 0.045 0.981 0.019 0.011 0.005 0.067 0.947
ѕ(15) 0.035 0.014 0.014 0.058 0.991 0.021 0.008 0.010 0.051 0.947
β 0 0.041 0.017 0.015 0.068 0.991 0.022 0.007 0.010 0.042 0.936
β 1 -0.030 0.026 -0.068 0.064 0.867 -0.007 0.020 -0.042 0.080 0.912
β 2 -0.026 0.036 -0.147 0.058 0.854 -0.006 0.045 -0.151 0.159 0.927
CR 37.535 1.042 36.000 39.000 0.977 42.405 2.208 36.000 45.000 0.978
TB -0.366 0.191 -0.776 0.039 0.984 -0.275 0.169 -0.585 0.269 0.982
σ TB 0.156 0.061 0.041 0.324 0.985 0.135 0.052 0.077 0.328 0.985
ѕ(5) 0.026 0.012 0.011 0.075 0.948 0.026 0.011 0.013 0.073 0.930
ѕ(15) 0.032 0.010 0.020 0.078 0.950 0.028 0.010 0.014 0.062 0.949
β 0 0.035 0.010 0.023 0.079 0.954 0.029 0.009 0.013 0.063 0.952
β 1 -0.026 0.016 -0.079 0.006 0.915 -0.006 0.016 -0.055 0.061 0.747
β 2 -0.011 0.041 -0.113 0.118 0.945 -0.002 0.030 -0.124 0.127 0.757
CR 32.701 0.876 31.000 34.500 0.910 33.363 2.775 27.000 37.000 0.977
TB -0.774 0.108 -1.065 -0.446 0.978 -0.864 0.239 -1.253 -0.202 0.991
σ TB 0.074 0.030 0.024 0.149 0.985 0.099 0.037 0.042 0.209 0.984
∆ TT -0.485 3.357 -7.345 5.405 0.994 -0.404 3.976 -8.221 8.399 0.993
σ ∆ TT 1.869 0.658 0.795 3.391 0.987 2.191 1.309 0.683 5.328 0.993
AR(1)Country Mean StDev Min Max Mean StDev Min Max AR(1)
Turkey
Panel A: Pre-Lehman Panel B: Post-Lehman
Brazil
Mexico
Philippines
US
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TABLE 4. WITHIN-SAMPLE PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
The table reports the adjusted coefficient of determination Adj.R2 of each model as measure of its in-sample predictive 
ability, and Wald test statistics for the significance of the predictability gain  ∆Adj.R2 afforded by the country-specific 
variables; the null hypothesis is that the coefficient of the additional country-specific variable(s) in model GEMj is zero. 
Model G2 includes as predictors the spread curve factors and global variables (U.S. yield curve factors and volatility of 
the U.S. short-term interest rate). GEM1 adds country rating, GEM2 adds trade balance, GEM3 adds volatility of trade 
balance, GEM4 adds terms-of-trade growth, and GEM5 adds volatility of terms-of-trade growth. *, ** and *** denote 
significance of the ∆Adj.R2 at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The estimation period is July 1, 2003 
to October 14, 2008 (268 weeks; pre-Lehman) or December 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013 (263 weeks; post-Lehman). 
Table 2 lists the hierarchical models.   
 
Model
G2 Adj.R2 0.842 0.878 0.692 0.792 0.853 0.946 0.741 0.681
GEM1 Adj.R2 0.870 0.897 0.691 0.804 0.856 0.953 0.741 0.680
Wald stat. 10.75 *** 10.65 *** 0.14 3.20 * 3.40 * 18.17 *** 0.48 0.04
GEM2 Adj.R2 0.870 0.897 0.693 0.803 0.858 0.953 0.757 0.700
Wald stat. 0.29 0.69 0.66 0.00 1.74 0.27 6.10 ** 5.11 **
GEM3 Adj.R2 0.876 0.897 0.693 0.822 0.861 0.954 0.762 0.727
Wald stat. 2.99 * 0.20 0.47 11.83 *** 2.78 * 2.89 * 2.30 13.21 ***
GEM4 Adj.R2 0.875 0.899 0.694 0.825 0.788 0.726
Wald stat. 0.01 1.84 0.93 1.50 13.87 *** 0.16
GEM5 Adj.R2 0.876 0.900 0.694 0.824 0.794 0.735
Wald stat. 1.06 0.77 0.18 0.08 4.39 ** 6.37 **
G2 Adj.R2 0.786 0.674 0.770 0.738 0.799 0.794 0.724 0.667
GEM1 Adj.R2 0.787 0.674 0.775 0.737 0.802 0.798 0.747 0.690
Wald stat. 0.51 0.19 1.82 0.04 2.44 4.89 ** 7.76 *** 7.41 ***
GEM2 Adj.R2 0.791 0.679 0.779 0.736 0.817 0.804 0.793 0.718
Wald stat. 1.82 1.30 2.33 0.02 9.96 *** 3.41 * 21.64 *** 8.18 ***
GEM3 Adj.R2 0.796 0.695 0.789 0.769 0.827 0.803 0.822 0.744
Wald stat. 1.73 3.47 * 6.87 *** 15.35 *** 8.27 *** 0.00 17.39 *** 9.99 ***
GEM4 Adj.R2 0.804 0.717 0.791 0.768 0.825 0.757
Wald stat. 5.21 ** 8.87 *** 0.71 0.13 2.07 4.30 **
GEM5 Adj.R2 0.822 0.753 0.793 0.768 0.824 0.758
Wald stat. 8.36 *** 17.84 *** 1.11 0.06 0.07 0.55
Bond maturity
5 years 15 years 5 years
Bond maturity
15 years 15 years
Panel A: Pre-Lehman 
Panel B: Post-Lehman 
Brazil Mexico TurkeyPhilippines
5 years
Bond maturity Bond maturity
5 years 15 years
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TABLE 5. OUT-OF-SAMPLE PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
The first row in each panel reports the RMSE of the baseline credit spread curve model. The following rows show 
the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand and the preceding (nested) model. Ratio RMSE < 1 indicates that the 
additional global macroeconomic predictors in the extended model bring a forecast error reduction vis-à-vis the 
preceding model. Significance of the mean error differential is tested with the Clark and West (2007; CW) t-
statistic for the null hypothesis that the predictive ability of the extended model is not superior to that of the 
preceding model; 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 vs. 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 for model G1 and 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 ≤
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2vs. 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺1 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 for model G2. ***, ** and * denotes rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, 
respectively. Model G1 adds the U.S. yield curve factors. Model G2 adds the volatility of the U.S. short-term 
interest rate. Table 2 lists the models.  Estimation is based on weekly data and the forecast horizon is h=13 weeks 
(quarter ahead). Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is November 28, 2006 to 
October 14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) and March 27, 2012 to December, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Model
Baseline RMSE 59.6 67.3 35.8 29.5 59.4 42.0 40.6 30.9
G1 Ratio RMSE 1.49 1.29 0.76 0.84 0.85 0.80 0.86 0.95
CW statistic 0.62 0.11 2.54 ** 2.72 *** 3.55 *** 4.37 *** 3.19 *** 2.63 ***
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.88 0.92 1.02 0.92 1.07 1.10 1.06 0.90
CW statistic 1.35 * 1.25 -0.25 1.04 -0.62 -0.53 2.12 ** 2.16 **
Baseline RMSE 33.4 39.8 24.9 26.6 27.50 41.9 48.2 44.3
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.94 0.87 0.71 0.88 0.93
CW statistic 1.86 ** 2.18 ** 2.64 *** 2.22 ** 2.11 ** 2.92 *** 3.71 *** 3.23 ***
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.85 0.95 0.91 0.92 1.01 0.96 0.97 0.95
CW statistic 3.08 *** 2.22 ** 2.82 *** 2.99 *** -0.94 2.52 *** 1.26 1.81 **
Bond maturity
Brazil Mexico Philippines Turkey
15-years
Bond maturity
Panel A: Pre-Lehman 
Panel B: Post-Lehman 
Bond maturity
5-years 15-years
Bond maturity
5-years 15-years5-years 15-years5-years
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TABLE 6. BENCHMARKING THE FORECASTING ABILITY OF GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
The table reports the RMSE of the benchmark (random walk or slope-regression) model and the ratio of RMSEs 
of the model at hand to the benchmark. Ratio RMSE < 1 indicates that the model brings a forecast error reduction 
versus the benchmark. Significance of the forecast accuracy gains is assessed with the Diebold and Mariano (1995) 
t-statistic for the null hypothesis of equal mean squared error; 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 = 0 vs.𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ −
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 0. *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. The baseline model, eq. (4), 
exploits the credit spread curve factors. Model G1 adds the U.S. yield curve factors. Model G2 adds the U.S. short-
term interest rate volatility. Table 2 provides details on the models.  Estimation is based on weekly data and the 
forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter-ahead). Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period 
is November 28, 2006 to October 14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) and March 27, 2012 to December 31, 2013 
(90 forecasts; post-Lehman). 
  
Model
Benchmark RMSE 50.9 48.1 50.9 51.6 40.2 31.6 38.5 30.8
Baseline Ratio RMSE 1.17 1.40 1.17 1.30 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.96
DM stat. -1.28 -2.56 -2.12 -2.91 2.69 *** 1.07 1.41 0.66
G1 Ratio RMSE 1.74 1.80 1.74 1.68 0.67 0.78 0.70 0.80
DM stat. -2.07 -2.81 -2.32 -3.13 2.84 *** 1.93 * 3.34 *** 2.53 **
G2 Ratio RMSE 1.53 1.65 1.53 1.54 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.79
DM stat. -1.86 -2.90 -2.08 -3.15 2.58 *** 2.09 ** 3.04 *** 2.54 **
Benchmark RMSE 62.2 38.9 59.7 38.4 47.9 34.8 48.0 34.1
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.96 1.08 1.00 1.10 0.85 0.89 0.85 0.91
DM stat. 1.13 -0.73 0.15 -1.00 1.37 0.83 1.12 0.60
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.81 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.73 0.85 0.72 0.87
DM stat. 2.00 ** 1.28 2.21 ** 1.24 2.11 ** 1.05 2.75 *** 1.00
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.87 0.96 0.91 0.97 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.78
DM stat. 1.04 0.36 0.91 0.25 2.17 ** 1.73 * 1.70 * 1.83 *
Benchmark RMSE 36.1 44.4 36.3 47.0 26.6 29.0 28.0 32.3
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.85 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.82
DM stat. 0.86 1.16 0.55 1.77 * 1.13 0.96 1.23 2.06 **
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.87 0.73 0.78
DM stat. 0.96 1.44 1.05 2.46 ** 1.80 * 1.07 2.54 ** 3.48 ***
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.77 0.70 0.79 0.67 0.71
DM stat. 2.54 ** 2.38 ** 2.01 ** 3.78 *** 2.39 ** 1.91 * 2.84 *** 3.76 ***
Benchmark RMSE 31.9 41.6 38.1 42.0 64.4 58.8 59.5 57.2
Baseline Ratio RMSE 0.86 1.01 0.72 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.77
DM stat. 2.53 ** -0.05 2.38 ** 0.03 2.49 ** 2.22 ** 2.14 ** 2.33 **
G1 Ratio RMSE 0.75 0.72 0.62 0.71 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.72
DM stat. 2.21 ** 2.13 ** 3.50 *** 2.65 *** 2.69 *** 2.24 ** 2.59 *** 2.47 **
G2 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.68 0.63 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.69
DM stat. 2.12 ** 2.39 ** 3.47 *** 3.01 *** 2.93 *** 2.62 *** 2.86 *** 2.88 ***
Brazil Mexico
Philippines Turkey
5-years 15-years
Brazil Mexico
5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years
Panel A: Pre-Lehman
Panel B: Post-Lehman
Philippines Turkey
Random walk Slope-regression Random walk Slope-regression 
Bond maturity Bond maturity Bond maturity Bond maturity
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TABLE 7. OUT-OF-SAMPLE PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF DOMESTIC MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
The first row in each panel reports the RMSE of model G2 which includes the spread curve factors and global 
variables (U.S. yield curve factors and U.S. short-term interest rate volatility) as predictors. The following rows 
report the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand versus the preceding (nested) model. Ratio RMSE < 1 indicates that 
the additional country-specific predictor in the extended model brings a forecast error reduction versus the preceding 
nested model. Significance of the error reduction is assessed with the Clark and West (2007; CW) t-test where the 
null hypothesis is that the predictive ability of the extended model is not superior to that of the preceding nested 
model; e.g. 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 vs. 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺2 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 for model GEM1 and 𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 ≤
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺2vs.𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺2 for model GEM2. ***, ** and * denote rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% 
level, respectively. GEM1 adds country rating. GEM2 adds trade balance. GEM3 further adds volatility of trade 
balance. GEM4 adds terms-of-trade growth. GEM5 adds volatility of terms-of-term growth. Table2 lists all the 
models. The forecast evaluation period is November 28, 2006 to October 14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) and 
March 27, 2012 to December 31, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman). Models GEM4 and GEM5 are not feasible for 
Philippines due to data unavailability on terms of trade. Estimation is based on weekly data and forecast horizon is 
h=13 weeks (quarter ahead). Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. 
  
Model
G2 RMSE 77.9 79.5 27.6 24.4 54.1 37.2 37.0 26.6
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 0.81 0.86 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.92 0.99 1.03
CW statistic 2.57 *** 2.43 *** -0.12 2.13 ** 1.03 2.61 *** 0.93 -1.87
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 1.12 1.08 1.05 1.04 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.10
CW statistic -3.93 -2.75 -0.42 -0.48 0.89 -0.15 0.83 0.36
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.95 1.01 1.04 1.04 0.98 0.97 1.09 0.93
CW statistic 2.53 *** -0.55 -1.66 0.22 1.66 ** 1.72 ** -1.77 2.30 **
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.28
CW statistic 0.39 1.04 0.47 0.52 3.84 *** -1.66
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 1.09 1.05 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.02
CW statistic -0.69 -0.39 0.15 -1.07 1.32 * 0.52
G2 RMSE 27.0 36.1 18.6 23.0 24.1 28.5 41.2 39.3
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 1.02 1.03 1.09 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.06 1.05
CW statistic -0.67 -1.49 -2.39 0.00 2.00 ** 2.21 ** 1.77 ** 1.68 **
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.99 0.99 1.07 1.02 1.03 1.01 0.96 0.96
CW statistic 0.82 0.88 0.02 -1.18 0.19 0.20 1.20 1.16
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.87
CW statistic 1.40 * 2.03 ** 1.69 ** 2.71 *** 0.78 -0.27 3.31 *** 2.39 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 1.03 0.95 1.02 1.04 0.99 0.95
CW statistic 0.37 1.91 ** -0.40 -1.27 1.17 1.91 **
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.96 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.03
CW statistic 1.49 * 3.11 *** 1.99 ** -2.32 -2.23 -1.62
15-years
Bond maturity
Panel A: Pre-Lehman 
Panel B: Post-Lehman 
Bond maturity Bond maturity
Brazil
Bond maturity
Philippines TurkeyMexico
5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years 5-years
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TABLE 8. BENCHMARKING THE OOS FORECASTING ABILITY OF DOMESTIC MACRO VARIABLES 
 
The table reports the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand versus the benchmark (random walk or slope-
regression model). Significance is assessed through the Diebold and Mariano (1995) t-test for the hypotheses 
𝐻𝐻0:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 = 0 vs.𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 0. *, ** and *** denotes rejection at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level, respectively. Estimation is based on weekly data and the forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter 
ahead). Bond maturity is 𝜏𝜏 = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is November 28, 2006 to October 
14, 2008 (92 forecasts; pre-Lehman) and March 27, 2012 to December 31, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman). 
See note to Table 7 for a description of the models. Table 2 provides the full list of hierarchical models. 
Model
GEM1 Ratio RMSE 1.24 1.42 1.24 1.32 0.69 0.73 0.72 0.75
DM stat. -1.21 -2.86 -1.53 -3.34 2.60 *** 2.59 *** 3.03 *** 2.75 ***
GEM2 RMSE Ratio 1.40 1.52 1.40 1.42 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.78
DM stat. -2.04 -3.56 -2.66 -4.11 2.33 ** 2.25 ** 2.81 *** 2.39 **
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 1.33 1.53 1.33 1.43 0.75 0.79 0.78 0.81
DM stat. -1.87 -3.52 -2.56 -4.07 2.04 ** 2.02 ** 2.38 ** 2.79 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 1.34 1.54 1.34 1.44 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.81
DM stat. -1.87 -3.02 -2.45 -3.38 2.15 ** 2.00 ** 2.54 ** 3.10 ***
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 1.46 1.62 1.46 1.51 0.75 0.80 0.78 0.82 ***
DM stat. -2.30 -3.15 -2.68 -3.20 2.07 ** 1.81 * 2.39 ** 2.65
GEM1 RMSE Ratio 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.80
DM stat. 1.15 1.05 1.06 1.01 2.14 ** 1.57 1.72 * 1.62
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.79 0.86 0.79 0.88
DM stat. 1.18 1.00 1.16 0.96 1.69 * 0.91 1.57 0.91
GEM3 Ratio RMSE 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.82
DM stat. 1.32 1.24 1.35 1.21 1.06 1.36 1.04 1.79 *
GEM4 0.71 1.03 0.71 1.05
2.25 ** -0.15 2.01 ** -0.52
GEM5 0.72 1.04 0.72 1.06
2.16 ** -0.23 2.00 ** -0.51
GEM1 RMSE Ratio 0.76 0.84 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.7 0.71
DM stat. 2.63 *** 2.28 ** 1.86 * 3.34 *** 2.23 ** 1.90 * 2.59 *** 3.80 ***
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.8 0.73
DM stat. 2.78 *** 2.57 ** 1.85 * 3.33 *** 1.40 1.75 * 1.83 * 3.54 ***
GEM3 RMSE Ratio 0.74 0.79 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.7 0.60
DM stat. 2.88 *** 2.89 *** 1.91 * 3.26 *** 1.59 2.66 *** 1.92 * 3.44 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.80 0.70 0.8 0.63
DM stat. 2.37 ** 2.92 *** 1.72 * 3.32 *** 1.50 2.40 ** 1.87 * 3.34 ***
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.67 0.78 0.71 0.7 0.64
DM stat. 2.63 *** 3.12 *** 1.87 * 3.43 *** 1.62 2.32 ** 1.95 * 3.28 ***
GEM1 RMSE Ratio 0.73 0.67 0.61 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.72
DM stat. 2.37 ** 2.52 ** 3.69 *** 3.14 *** 2.37 ** 2.18 ** 2.59 *** 2.84 ***
GEM2 Ratio RMSE 0.76 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.69
DM stat. 2.19 ** 2.51 ** 3.82 *** 3.21 *** 2.41 ** 2.30 ** 2.31 ** 2.62 ***
GEM3 RMSE Ratio 0.76 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.60
DM stat. 2.64 *** 2.53 ** 3.68 *** 3.14 *** 2.87 *** 2.63 *** 2.70 *** 2.71 ***
GEM4 Ratio RMSE 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.57
DM stat. 2.92 *** 2.83 *** 2.72 *** 2.82 ***
GEM5 Ratio RMSE 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.59
DM stat. 2.88 *** 2.79 *** 2.65 *** 2.73 ***
15-years
Random Walk Slope Regression Random Walk Slope Regression 
Bond maturity Bond maturity Bond maturity Bond maturity
5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years 5-years 15-years
Panel A: Pre-Lehman
Brazil Mexico
Philippines Turkey
5-years
Brazil
Philippines Turkey
Mexico
Panel B: Post-Lehman
